Recent events in Libya have turned the spotlight on an aspect of international investment law that has, so far, attracted little attention. Investments, almost by definition, require stability and cannot thrive in situations of violence and political volatility. Libya is host to a number of important foreign investments, notably in the energy sector. The current armed struggle has seriously affected these investments and is likely to lead to a series of disputes with foreign investors. At the same time Libya is party to bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with several countries
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Similar situations have arisen and are likely to arise in the future in other parts of the world. Therefore, a discussion about the protection of foreign investments in times of armed conflicts is by no means relevant only to the current situation in Libya.
A. Treaties in Times of Armed Conflict
Investment law is in large measure governed by treaties. Therefore, the preliminary The Draft Articles define "armed conflict" as armed force between States or protracted armed force between government authorities and organized armed groups. 3 Therefore, international as well as non-international armed conflicts are covered. As far as noninternational armed conflicts are concerned, these would have to be more than merely sporadic.
The Draft Articles contain a presumption of continuity of treaties: the outbreak of an armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of treaties. 4 In addition, the Draft Articles offer a list of treaties the subject matter of which implies continued operation during armed conflicts. This list includes "treaties of friendship commerce and navigation and analogous agreements concerning private rights." It also includes "treaties relating to commercial arbitration". 5 Where a treaty contains express provisions on its operation in situations of armed conflict these provisions shall apply. 6 As will be shown below, some bilateral investment treaties contain specific provisions that address the consequences of armed conflict.
Termination or suspension of a treaty in times of armed conflict would be subject to certain formalities. An intention by a State Party to terminate or suspend requires notification. A State Party thus affected may object. This procedure would lead to the obligation to resort to dispute settlement. The rights and obligations of States with regard to dispute settlement, as far as they have remained applicable, despite the existence of the armed conflict, under other provision of the Draft Articles, remain unaffected by a notification of termination or suspension. 7 Even where suspension or termination takes 4 Draft Article 3: Absence of ipso facto termination or suspension The outbreak of an armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of treaties as: (a) Between States parties to the treaty that are also parties to the conflict; (b) Between a State party to the treaty that is also a party to the conflict and a State that is a third State in relation to the conflict. 5 Draft Article 5: The operation of treaties on the basis of implication from their subject matter [1.] In the case of treaties the subject matter of which involves the implication that they continue in operation, in whole or in part, during armed conflict, the incidence of an armed conflict will not as such affect their operation. Therefore, as a rule, treaties dealing with the protection of foreign investments, such as bilateral investment treaties, continue to apply after the outbreak of armed hostilities. This is particularly so where these treaties address the consequences of armed conflicts.
Some BITs contain general security clauses. These clauses reserve the right of States to take measures to safeguard its essential interests in emergency situations. Security clauses of this kind are discussed below in section D.
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) contain several types of clauses dealing with violent situations including armed conflict. These treaty provisions safeguard the interests of investors even in situations of armed conflict. Some of these treaty clauses have been interpreted and applied by investment tribunals.
The most common provision of this kind that may be found in most BITs is a clause guaranteeing full protection and security (section B below). In addition, some BITs contain clauses that specifically address wars and other armed conflicts. One type of these "war clauses" merely promises non-discrimination in the treatment of losses incurred through armed conflicts and similar situations (section C 1. below). The other type goes 1. A State engaged in armed conflict intending to terminate or withdraw from a treaty to which it is a party, or to suspend the operation of that treaty, shall notify the other State party or States parties to the treaty, or its depositary, of that intention. … 3. Nothing in the preceding paragraphs shall affect the right of a party to object, in accordance with the terms of the treaty or applicable rules of international law, to termination, withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of the treaty. … 4. If an objection has been raised within the prescribed time limit, the States parties concerned shall seek a solution through the means indicated in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. 5. Nothing in the preceding paragraphs shall affect the rights or obligations of States with regard to the settlement of disputes insofar as they have remained applicable, pursuant to draft articles 4 to 7, despite the incidence of an armed conflict. 8 Draft Article 10: Separability of treaty provisions Termination, withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of the treaty as a consequence of an armed conflict shall, unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, take effect with respect to the whole treaty except where: (a) The treaty contains clauses that are separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their application; … 9 Draft Article 9: Obligations imposed by international law independently of a treaty The termination of or the withdrawal from a treaty, or the suspension of its operation, as a consequence of an armed conflict, shall not impair in any way the duty of any State to fulfil any obligation embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under international law independently of that treaty.
further and actually promises compensation for losses incurred under these circumstances provided certain conditions are met (Section C 2. below).
B. Full Protection and Security.
Most investment treaties contain provisions granting protection and security for investments. 10 Many of these treaties, including the NAFTA 11 , refer to "full protection and security". 12 Others, including the Energy Charter Treaty 13 , refer to "most constant protection and security". Some put "security" before "protection". These variations in language do not appear to carry any substantive significance.
There is no doubt that this provision is designed to protect investors and investments against violent action. In fact, in a number of cases tribunals seem to have assumed that this standard applies exclusively to physical security and to the host State's duty to protect the investor against violence directed at persons and property stemming from State organs or private parties. 14 More recently, there is authority to the effect that this standard extends to legal protection. 
Violence by State Organs
Clauses guaranteeing protection and security have been applied in a number of cases. In some of these cases the violent action came from State organs. It is clear that the State is responsible for actions perpetrated by its organs. 16 The applicability of a treaty provision 10 Provisions on full protection and security are contained in Libya's BITs with Austria, BelgiumLuxemburg (subject to a public order exception), Italy, Portugal and Switzerland. The Arbitral Tribunal also does not consider that the "full security" standard is limited to a State's failure to prevent actions by third parties, but also extends to actions by organs and representatives of the State itself.
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In AMT v. Zaire, 18 the investment had been subject to looting by elements of Zaire's armed forces. The applicable treaty provided that "... protection and security of investment shall be in accordance with applicable national laws, and may not be less than that recognized by international law... ". The Tribunal found that the treaty provision imposed upon Zaire a duty of vigilance to take all necessary measures of precaution. Zaire had breached this obligation by taking no measure that would ensure the protection and security of the investment. It followed that Zaire was in breach of its treaty obligation.
19
The Tribunal said:
… Zaire has breached its obligation by taking no measure whatever that would serve to ensure the protection and security of the investment in question. ... Zaire is responsible for its inability to prevent the disastrous consequences of these events adversely affecting the investments of AMT which Zaire had the obligation to protect.
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... Zaire has manifestly failed to respect the minimum standard required of it by international law. 21 ... The responsibility of the State of Zaire is incontestably engaged by the very fact of an omission by Zaire to take every measure necessary to protect and ensure the security of the investment made by AMT in its territory. 22 Interestingly, the Tribunal did not base responsibility on the attribution of the acts of the soldiers to the State but on the State's failure to protect the investment.
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State. 
Private Violence
Another important application of the protection and security standard concerns the State's duty to protect the investor against violence stemming from non-State actors. These may be rebels or insurgents engaged in a struggle against the government or private groups engaged in violent action against the investment.
In AAPL v. Sri Lanka, 25 the investment had been destroyed in the course of a counterinsurgency operation by the Sri Lankan Security Forces. The applicable treaty provided that foreign investments "shall enjoy full protection and security". The Tribunal found no conclusive evidence as to whether the destruction had been caused by the State's security forces or by the rebels. 26 The Tribunal stated that while a State is not, in principle, responsible for the actions of insurgents it had a duty of protection that applied regardless of whether the damaging acts originated from the insurgents or government forces. The
Tribunal said:
It is a generally accepted rule of International Law, clearly stated in international arbitral awards and in the writings of the doctrinal authorities, that: (i) A State on whose territory an insurrection occurs is not responsible for loss or damage sustained by foreign investors unless it can be shown that the Government of that state failed to provide the standard of protection required, either by treaty, or under general customary law, as the case may be; and (ii)
Failure to provide the standard or protection required entails the state's international responsibility for losses suffered, regardless of whether the damages occurred during an insurgents' offensive act or resulting from governmental counter-insurgency activities. On that basis the Tribunal found Sri Lanka responsible. 28 After a detailed analysis of the course of events the Tribunal concluded:
…the Tribunal considers that the Respondent through said inaction and omission violated its due diligence obligation which requires undertaking all possible measures that could be reasonably expected to prevent the occurrence of killings and property destructions.
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The guarantee of full protection and security extends to a duty to protect against violent 
Standard of Liability
It is generally accepted that the obligation to provide protection and security does not create absolute liability. Rather, the standard is one of "due diligence", i.e. a reasonable degree of vigilance. 35 In AAPL v. Sri Lanka 36 the Tribunal rejected claimant's argument that the provision granting "full protection and security" had created a strict or absolute liability. The 
C. War Clauses in Investment Treaties

Non-Discrimination Clauses
Many bilateral investment treaties contain clauses referring to war or to other forms of armed conflict, state of emergency, revolution, insurrection, civil disturbance or similar events. In their simple form these clauses provide for national treatment and most 37 At para. 53. Article 7 of the Libya-Portugal BIT contains such a clause:
Article 7 Compensation for damages or losses
Each Party shall provide to investors of the other Party, whose investments suffer losses in the territory of the first Party owing to war or armed conflict, revolution, a state of national emergency, disobedience or disturbances or any other event considered as such, treatment that restitutes the conditions of these investments that existed before the damage had occurred, or compensation, or any other settlement that is no less favourable than that Party accords to the investments of its own investors, or of any third State, whichever is more favourable. Any payment made under this article shall be, without delay, freely transferable in convertible currency.
Provisions of this type are not uncommon in BITs. 42 The NAFTA in Article 1105(2) also contains the obligation to non-discriminatory treatment with respect to measures adopted relating to losses suffered owing to armed conflict or civil strife.
Clauses of this type do not create substantive rights to restitution or compensation beyond non-discrimination vis-à-vis host State nationals or nationals of third countries. In other words, their effect depends on measures taken by the host State in relation to these investors. 43 In CMS v. Argentina the Tribunal said with respect to a similar provision in Article IV(3) of the Argentina-US BIT:
The plain meaning of the Article is to provide a floor treatment for the investor in the context of the measures adopted in respect of the losses suffered in the emergency, not different from that applied to nationals or other foreign investors. The Article does not derogate from the Treaty rights but rather ensures that any measures directed at offsetting or minimizing losses will be applied in a non-discriminatory manner.
Extended War Clauses
Some treaties contain extended war clauses. These extended war clauses also relate to war or to other armed conflict, state of emergency, revolution, insurrection, civil disturbance or similar events. They typically include the non-discrimination clause just described. But they go further in that they also contain absolute standards. Under these clauses losses suffered by investors at the hand of the host State's forces or authorities through requisitioning or destruction not required by the necessities of the situation are treated in analogy to expropriation. In other words such acts require compensation that is prompt, adequate and effective. Article 12 of the Energy Charter Treaty is an example for such an extended war clause.
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Article 15 of the BIT between Austria and Libya contains such an extended war clause.
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Its first paragraph reflects the standard of non-discrimination previously discussed. Its second paragraph goes beyond non-discrimination and provides for an absolute standard of restitution or compensation:
ARTICLE 5
Compensation for Losses
(1) An investor of a Contracting Party who has suffered a loss relating to its investment in the territory of the other Contracting Party due to war or to other armed conflict, state of emergency, revolution, insurrection, civil disturbance, or any other similar event, or acts of God or force majeure, in the territory of the latter Contracting Party, shall be accorded by the latter Contracting Party, as regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or any other settlement, treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to its own investors or to investors of any third state, whichever is most favourable to the investor.
(2) An investor of a Contracting Party who in any of the events referred to in paragraph (1) suffers loss resulting from:
(a) requisitioning of its investment or part thereof by the forces or authorities of the other Contracting Party, or (b) destruction of its investment or part thereof by the forces or authorities of the other Contracting Party, which was not required by the necessity of the situation, shall in any case be accorded by the latter Contracting Party restitution or compensation which in either case shall be prompt, adequate and effective and, with respect to compensation, shall be in accordance with Article 4 (2) and (3).
It will be noted that under paragraph (2) (2) Without prejudice to paragraph (1) of this Article, nationals and companies of one Contracting Party who in any of the situations referred to in that paragraph suffer losses in the territory of the other Contracting Party resulting from (a) requisitioning of their property by its forces or authorities, or (b) destruction of their property by its forces or authorities which was not caused in combat action or was not required by the necessity of the situation, shall be accorded restitution or adequate compensation. Resulting payments shall be freely transferable.
The Tribunal refused to grant a remedy under this provision seeing that there was no conclusive proof that the losses were incurred as a consequence of acts committed by government forces. The Tribunal said:
… it has to be noted that the foreign investor who invokes the applicability of said Article 4.(2) assumed a heavy burden of proof, since he has, …, to establish: (i) that the governmental forces and not the rebels caused the destruction; (ii) that this destruction occurred out[side] of "combat"; (iii) that there was no "necessity" in the sense that the destruction could have been reasonably avoided due to its unnecessary character under the prevailing circumstances. … there is no convincing evidence produced which sufficiently sustains the Claimant's allegation that the firing which caused the property destruction came from the governmental troops, and no reliable evidence was adduced to prove that the shrimps were lost due to acts committed by the security forces; … Therefore the Arbitral Tribunal finds that the first condition required under Article 4.(2) cannot be considered fulfilled in the present case, due to the lack of convincing evidence proving that the losses were incurred due to acts committed by the governmental forces. 48 The Tribunal found that the second and third condition were also not met: the destruction was caused by "combat action" in the sense of Article 4(2)(b). 49 In addition, the Tribunal was unable to conclusively determine the issue of military necessity.
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In AMT v. Zaire 51 the looting and destruction had taken place at the hands of elements of the armed forces in uniform involving the use of army weapons. In interpreting an extended war clause of the type discussed here, the Tribunal reached the conclusion that the soldiers in uniform did not, in fact, represent the country's armed forces since they had acted individually and not in any organized manner. Therefore, the destruction was caused by separate individuals and not the "forces". The Tribunal said:
In the present case, it is true from the information received that they were the military, at least persons in military attire who manifestly acted individually without any one being able to show either that they were organized or that they were under order, nor indeed that they were concerted. The nature of the looting and the destruction of property which were looted show clearly that it was not "the army" or "the armed 48 At paras. 58-60. 
D. Security Clauses in Investment Treaties
Some treaties, especially BITs of the United States, contain general security exceptions.
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The NAFTA in Article 2102 also contains a provision of this kind. Article XI of the BIT between Argentina and the United States is an example:
ARTICLE XI This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests. A more recent version based on the 2004 US Model BIT is self judging in that it contains the words "that it considers necessary". 55 This provision has received much attention, especially as it relates to the customary international law requirements for a state of necessity as reflected in Article 25 of the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility. This discussion and the relevant cases do not concern an armed conflict but an alleged economic emergency. 56 The application of a security exception of this kind has radical and far reaching consequences. In the words of the CMS ad hoc Committee:
Article XI is a threshold requirement: if it applies, the substantive obligations under the Treaty do not apply.
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Article XI, if and for so long as it applied, excluded the operation of the substantive provisions of the BIT. 
E. Armed Conflict and force majeure
In some cases the existence of violent situations has played an incidental role in investment cases. In a number of cases parties to investment disputes invoked armed conflicts and other situations of violence as an excuse for the non-performance of their obligations. This is not a peculiarity of investment arbitration. For the sake of completeness, a few examples for the invocation of force majeure in investment cases are summarized here.
In Autopista v. Venezuela 59 the investor was entitled to a road toll increase under the terms of a concession agreement. These toll increases had been prevented by civil unrest and rioting. Venezuela pleaded force majeure. The Tribunal found that a successful invocation of force majeure required that three conditions be met. These were impossibility of performance, unforeseeability of the intervening event and non-attributability of the intervening event to the defaulting party. 60 On the facts of the case the Tribunal found that the situation had been foreseeable and hence rejected Venezuela's reliance on force majeure.
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In Toto v. Lebanon 62 the Claimant had complained about a long delay in court proceedings. 63 The Tribunal noted that in the intervening period there had been terrorist bombings, assassinations, a war with Israel and two instances of severe internal fighting.
This, together with the Claimant's own inaction, led the Tribunal to conclude that under the prima facie test it did not have jurisdiction over this complaint. 64 In RSM c/ République Centrafricaine 65 the investor excused its failure to perform certain aspects of a contract by relying on force majeure. The argument was based on political and civic troubles which had led to a coup d'état and on the general security situation in the country. The contract defined force majeure as "tout événement imprévisible, irrésistible et indépendant de la volonté de la Partie l'invoquant, tels que tremblement de terre,
Conclusion
So far, the known effects of armed conflict on investment protection have been few and sporadic. But as we have seen the legal potential is considerable and it is quite likely that we will see more cases in the future.
Treaties for the protection of investments do not generally become inapplicable in times of armed conflict. In fact, some of the provisions in these treaties are designed to afford protection in situations of violent struggle. However, some of these treaties contain broad security clauses that exempt host States from compliance with the treaties' substantive standards in violent emergency situations.
Most treaties guarantee full protection and security. This standard involves an obligation by the host State to spare the investment from violent actions. It also requires a measure of protection against violent interference by private parties, and rebel forces.
Some treaties contain clauses that specifically refer to armed conflicts. In their simple and more frequent form these war clauses merely promise non-discrimination when it comes to measures designed to remedy the consequences of armed conflicts. Some treaties go further and contain a positive obligation of restitution or compensation in cases of requisitioning or destruction of investments. However, this obligation is subject to a number of restrictive requirements.
Therefore, investor protection in times of armed conflict will in large measure depend on the availability of favourable treaties upon which the investor can rely. The current situation is far from uniform and offers a patchwork of treaty provisions that favour some investors in some countries but leave other investors without treaty protection. The example of Libya shows vividly that only investors from certain nations enjoy treaty protection. Even for investors who can rely on treaties, their position is by no means uniform. To some extent this may be remedied by the availability of most favoured nation clauses. A satisfactory solution would require a much denser network of bilateral treaties or a widely ratified multilateral treaty.
